这几天世界最受瞩目的新闻,应当是北韩独裁者金正日去世的消息。不过这种来自国际社会的关注当真是“几家欢乐几家愁”。
西方民主国家大多是希望北韩从此能够结束极权独裁政治,走上改革之路,从此不再成为影响世界尤其是东亚政治稳定的祸害。但对于北韩的政治靠山中国与俄罗斯来说,对金氏政权未来命运的关注内涵要复杂得多。在两国中相比较,中国的关注度与骨肉相连之感更甚于俄罗斯。这从北京的悼念规格与悼词的用法,以及官方媒体的报道处理方式均可看出。打开互联网门户网站首页,看到的全是金正恩将接班,朝媒称军队和人民发誓拥护的定心丸,以及民众痛哭悼念,部分老人妇女当场哭昏等类政治八卦。北京唁电更是充分表达了极权者痛失亲密朋友的惺惺相惜之心情。
但中国人因为经历过1976年毛泽东去世的同样场景,见惯了这种充满了虚假的文字,谁也没将官方宣传当真。网友除了在微博上表达对独裁者去世的欢悦心情之外,更多的是关注北韩今后的政局将发生何种变化。
北韩政治的变化取决于几个不确定因素及其互相影响程度。其中首先取决于北韩内部政治的演变。目前北韩这位新主子金正恩被金正日选为政治“接班人”,并非由于他具有什么非凡的政治才能,而是血缘及其生母的得宠程度。这种继位方式几乎就是封建王朝继位方式的活化石。
关于金正恩如何巩固权力,据韩国《中央日报》今年9月22日报道,时任朝鲜劳动党中央军事委员会副委员长金正恩已对朝军进行改编,撤下原一线指挥官,换上的对自己忠诚的年轻一代军官。同时逐步接手党内事务,通过让朝鲜居民家中悬挂其肖像树立个人权威。目前的政治倾向尚无异动,但经济上有改良愿望,据日本《读卖新闻》12月上旬报道,金正恩11月份在平壤一次会议上说过,“ 国民经济要在3年内恢复到上世纪60年代到70年代的水准,让朝鲜人民达到吃米饭、喝肉汤、住瓦房、穿绸缎的生活水准”,此前,他还说了“过去可以没有粮食,但不能没有子弹;那么今天是可以没有子弹,但一定要有粮食”。
北韩在经济上有所改革,北京应该乐见其成。一是因为当初中国改革也是从让人民吃饱饭这个起点上走过来的;二是北韩经济状况有所改良,北京援助的包袱也会轻一点。但北韩如果想在政治上走上改革之路,北京与俄罗斯的态度会完全不同。
俄罗斯对北韩的态度,已有俄罗斯亲克里姆林宫的自由民主党领袖日里诺夫斯基的分析为证。他说,虽然朝鲜人民早已厌倦了目前的这种生活,都向往韩国民主体制。但金正日死后,朝鲜将延续斯大林式的政治体制。因为只要中国和俄罗斯这两个朝鲜的主要支持者没有真正的民主,就不应指望朝鲜民主化。日里诺夫斯基很肯定地说,“只有中国共产党垮台,俄罗斯社会更加民主化,朝鲜才会发生改变。”目前,“普京大帝”的政治声望正发生动摇,但能否从政治上的“冬天”走出来,进入“俄罗斯之春”,还得看未来几个月俄罗斯的局势发展。
对于北京来说,尽管金正日去世可能带来中朝关系变数是意料中事,但北京仍然希望自己能够控制北韩。北韩一直是北京手中重要的“战略资产”,在不同时期,这份“战略资产”可以发挥出不同的价值。“冷战”时期,它是中国独裁政治建立“共产主义防护带”的重要屏障;在中国“和平崛起”的十年当中,它是北京与美国叫板的重要砝码之一。北韩的存在及其在中国默许下的持续捣乱,是一个持续把中国推向世界舞台中心的幕后推手。有论者如此评价:“很难想像,没有北朝鲜这个麻烦制造者,西方的领导人是否还会如此频繁的想起他们的中国同事,这对急需舞台展现大国风采的中国领导人来说,显然是很失落的”。在今天,它仍然是北京在东北亚保持力量平衡的重要工具。因此,从主观愿望上来说,北京绝对不愿意北韩发生任何改变。不巧的是,金正日死得不是时候,正是北京今年外交失利,在亚太地区影响力急剧衰落之时。
因此,北京对北韩未来政局也不得不受以下几个因素的制约:一、对金正恩执政能力及北韩高层政治势力消长的观察结果;二、国际社会对北韩施加影响的强度;三、俄罗斯国内政治的走向。中国自今年11月以来外交上接连失利,尤其是面对多年以来结成“全面战略合作伙伴关系”的缅甸的疏离,已被迫改变以往那种强硬姿态,外交部最近公开表态,“中国无意也无力在亚太排挤美国”;在对缅甸外交上更是表现出前所未有的机会主义灵活性。最近,中国驻缅甸大使与缅甸民主派领导人昂山素季举行了罕见的会面,还表示,中国或参与推动昂山素季政党合法化。这是对缅甸政治变化的一种无可奈何的承认,也算是对缅甸外交的一种预先投资。
可以预测,在中国国内政治进入高风险状态之后,北京对北韩的外交也会采取相对灵活一点的措施,毕竟,北京已经意识到金钱外交不能形成长期的控制力,自身的软实力有严重问题,能守住自家的菜园子就算是不错的结果。
Uncertainties of North Korea’s Outlook
By He Qinglian on
Translated by @kRiZcPEc
http://hqlenglish.blogspot.com/2011/12/uncertainties-of-north-koreas-outlook.html
The most watched news these days should be the death of Kim Jong-il, the dictator of North Korea. Yet the attention the international community has on the matter is of mixed feelings.
Most of Western democracies wish that from here onward North Korea would end its totalitarian dictatorship, embark on the path of reform, and cease to be the scourge of the world—the political stability of East Asia in particular. But for China and Russia, the political patron of North Korea, their concern for North Korea has a more complicated context. Comparing the two countries, China’s level of concern and the sense of kinship are stronger than that of Russia. One could tell this from the mourning specification, choice of word in the eulogy from Beijing and the way Chinese state media reported the news. Visit an internet gateway and all that could be seen were Kim Jong-un is about take over, the military and the civilian have vowed to support the successor; as well as political gossip like the public cried in memory [of the Dear Leader], some elderly women collapse from crying on scene. The telegram sent from Beijing fully expressed the sorrowful mood a dictator has over the loss of a close friend.
The Chinese people, however, went through similar scenes in 1976 when Mao Zedong passed away, and became accustomed to insincere texts like this. No one took official propaganda seriously. Apart from expressing joyous feelings over the passing of a dictator, netizens are more concerned with how the political situation in North Korea would evolve.
How the political situation in North Korea would evolve depends on several uncertainties and the degree of these uncertainties influencing one another.
First, the situation depends on how internal politic would evolve in North Korea. The current new master Kim Jong-un got handpicked by Kim Jong-il as political successor was not because of the extraordinary political talent he has, but rather the kinship and the degree of grace his mother enjoyed. This way of succession is almost a living fossil of the throne of a feudal dynasty being passed on from one generation to the next.
Regarding how Kim Jong-un secures his power, Korea’s JoongAng Daily reported on September 22 that Kim, who served at that time as vice-chairman of Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea has started restructuring the North Korea’s armed force, replacing first tier commanders with officers from the younger generation who are loyal to Kim Jong-un. At the same time, he began to gradually take over Party affairs, creating his personal authority by ordering North Korean households to hang his portrait. At the moment, there is no unusual movement in North Korea’s political orientation, but there is the desire to improve the economy. According to a report by Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun in early December, Kim Jong-un said on conference that “the national economy has to return to the levels of 1960s and 1970s in three years so that the people can have a standard of living that allows them to eat rice, drink meat soup, live in tile-roofed house and wear silk.” Prior to this, he said, “in the past it was okay not to have food, but definitely not without bullets; today, it would be okay to have no bullets, but there must be food.”
Beijing should be happy to see North Korea start its economic reform. First, this is because China’s reform began at the starting point of keeping the people well-fed; second, improvements in North Korea’s economic situation would ease the aid burden on Beijing. But if North Korea wishes to embark on the path of political reform, the attitude of Beijing and Russia would be completely different.
Russia’s attitude toward North Korea has been made clear by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of pro-Kremlin Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. He said although the populace of North Korea is tired of the current way of life, and yearns for South Korea’s democratic system, the post-Kim Jong-il North Korea would continue the Stalinist political system. Because, so long as there is no real democracy in China and Russia, the two main backers of North Korea, people should not expect North Korea could be democratized. Zhirinovsky said with certainty that, “only when the Communist Party of China collapses, and Russian society becomes more democratized, can change take place in North Korea.” Currently, the political prestige of “Putin the Great” is shaking, but whether the country can move out of political winter and enter the Russian spring depends on the development of the situation in Russia over the next few months.
As for Beijing, although it knew for sure the passing of Kim Jong-il would bring uncertainties to Sino-North Korean ties, Beijing still hopes that it could control North Korea, the country that has been an important “strategic asset” in the hands of Beijing. At different times, this “strategic asset” could serve different purposes. During the “Cold War”, it was a crucial barrier of the protective Communism belt created by China’s dictatorship; during the ten years of China’s “peaceful rise”, North Korea was one of the significant weights with which China challenged the United States. The existence of North Korea and the troubles it causes with Beijing’s silent approval was a behind the scene helper that continually push China toward the center of the world’s theater. Some has given the following comment [on the ties of the two countries]: “It is hard to imagine that without North Korea the troublemaker, would Western leaders think of their Chinese counterparts as often as they did. For Chinese leaders who desperately need a stage to showcase China as a major power, this would certainly be disappointing.” Today, North Korea remains an important tool for Beijing to maintain the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Therefore, out of its subjective wishes, Beijing would definitely want no change to take place in North Korea. Yet, Kim Jong-il died an ill-timed death—exactly when Beijing suffered diplomatic setbacks and its influence in Asia-Pacific region rapidly declined.
Hence, Beijing’s influence over North Korean political situation has to be determined by the following factors: first, observation results of Kim Jong-un’s ability to govern and the gains and losses of high level political forces in North Korea; second, the degree of influence the international community has on North Korea; third, development of domestic politics in Russia.
Since November this year, China has had a succession of diplomatic setbacks, in particular Myanmar, the country with which China has formed a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” for years, is distancing itself from Beijing. All this forced China to change its once tough approach. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared recently that “China has neither the intention nor ability to drive the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region. And the country has shown an unprecedented opportunistic flexibility in addressing its diplomatic ties with Myanmar. Recently, China’s Ambassador to Myanmar held a rare meeting with the country’s pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and stated that China might help bring about the legalized status of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party. This move is both a reluctant acknowledgment of change in Myanmar’s politics and an investment in its diplomatic ties Myanmar in advance.
It is predictable that Beijing would take on a more flexible approach in its ties with North Korea after domestic politics in China entered a high risk state. After all, Beijing has come to realize that it cannot create a long lasting impact with dollar diplomacy; and that with the serious problems in its soft power, being able to keep its own garden is already something worth cheering for.
未普:金正日的两手策略和北京的最大噩梦
2011-12-21
http://www.rfa.org/cantonese/commentaries/weipu-12212011120751.html?encoding=simplified
朝鲜最高领导人金正日于12月17日猝死。不少外电认为,这是中国的绝好机会,中国将会加大对朝鲜的经济援助,促使新政权对中国的依赖。可 是北京方面却传出另一类忧虑的声音。北京的朝鲜半岛事务专家和一些学者担心,金正日的小儿子金正恩如接班不稳将可能导致政变,亲美政权便有可能出现。
在自己的北大门出现亲美政权,无疑是北京的最大噩梦。而这种担忧并非空穴来风风。胡锦涛一直把朝鲜当作值得学习的好伙伴,金正日却有自己 的盘算。不少迹像显示,在朝鲜和韩国、俄国、日本、美国和中国的六方关系中,金正日最重视的不是近在咫尺的朋友中国,而是远在天边的宿敌美国。
前 两年关于朝鲜无核化的“六方会谈”,中国一直试图扮演最重要的调停斡旋角色,以显示自己的国际地位。但是“六方会谈”谈谈停停,而停的原因,据朝方宣示, 竟是“朝鲜方面将视朝美双方会谈的结果,决定是否进行其他包括‘六方会谈’在内的多边会谈”。显然,朝鲜把和美国的双边会谈看得最重要。
进 入2011年,金正日或许知道自己大限将至,于是加紧部署在中国和美国之间,试图获取某种平衡的两手策略。一方面,金正日乘著专列在中国大陆境内畅通无 阻,和中共高层保持著高调而又热络的联系;另一方面,他又派朝鲜高级代表团神不知鬼不觉地访问了美国公司和学校,和美方保持著低调而同样热络的关系。
根 据Justin Rohrlich 12月19日在雅虎金融网站(Finance.yahoo.com)的文章,今年四月,一个由朝鲜贸易部长领队的代表团,悄悄访问了美国。据韩国媒体报 道,代表团有十二人,其中六位是部长级的高官,包括农业部、金融部、工业部的部长、两名高参等。该代表团访问了古歌(Google)、家得宝(Home Depot)、彭博集团(Bloomberg)、花旗银行(Citigroup)、环球制片厂(Universal Studios)和大型高科技公司,还有农场、批发站和港口,还参加了斯坦福大学和纽约大学的讲座,讲座的题目包括市场经济、公司战略、西方法律体制等。 这个代表团规矩很多,访美期间,不准记者靠近,不准媒体报道,访问古歌时走的是后门。
有趣的是,这支神秘的朝鲜代表团,据塔斯社透露,是 由谢淑丽(Susan Shirk)邀请的。谢淑丽是美国著名的中国问题专家,曾撰写大量有关中国政治的专著和论文,因在克林顿主政时的东亚局任职,又在大学任教,被称为官学两 栖人物,现任加州大学全球冲突与合作研究所主任,负责一项相当神秘的叫东北亚合作对话的项目。
这个项目是美国“二线外交” (“track-two”diplomacy)的一部分。“二线外交”指的是美国与具有冲突的非邦交国家之间,采取的以民间组织和个人为主的相互交流和交 往的方式。美国精英认为,美国和朝鲜没有外交关系,但保持交往非常重要,其重要性就像当年克林顿主张的与中国交往的重要性一样。谢淑丽等人于2009年 12月向美国政府提出政策建议,美国应当采取同朝鲜加强经济交往的长期战略,鼓励朝鲜改革开放,向市场经济过渡,这会造福于朝鲜老百姓,减少其外交政策的 对抗性和好战性。
这个“二线外交”行之有年,还未产生效果,金正日便突然过世。而美国和朝鲜前几个月的神秘交往,也终于在金正日死后被美 国媒体承认。12月19日,《华尔街日报》说,美国近几个月的确同平壤进行了谨慎接触,力求促使朝鲜回到“六方会谈”,美朝代表12月15日还对朝鲜的粮 食救援问题举行了会谈,并计划于12月23日举行朝鲜核谈。
面对朝鲜和美国的这些双向互动,中共无法不看在眼里,心生焦虑。但是现在的问题是,金正日的和中美同时交往的两手策略,是为了给儿子留下一个可以回旋折冲讨价还价的局面,还是只是为了解决国内要命的粮食恐慌问题,还是真的想搞市场经济了,这是一些谁也说不清的问题。
不 管是美国还是中国,韩国还是日本,几天以前,无人知道行为怪诞、好战成性的金正日会把朝鲜带往哪里,会给这个世界带来什么样的危险。今天金正日为了使小儿 子顺利接下他的家天下,不惜劳累过度,在专列上搭上了老命。而他为儿子留下的“锦囊妙计”,究竟是虚晃一枪,还是真的要改革开放了,相信不久就会有答案。
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金正恩如果一步到位实行欧美式民主,想成为朝鲜的蒋经国,道路将非常艰难,因为他没有蒋氏接班初期国际国内对专制制度尚有认可而能够巩固个人权威的阶段,他必须将巩固个人权威和民主化两件事同时进行,这就很有可能象戈尔巴乔夫那样失控。如果失控,则朝鲜前途难卜,而且丧失个人权威,即使能换来国家进步,即使能留下历史美名,毕竟是难咽的苦果。因此如果他不想一成不变地维持乃父体系,则很可能第一步先走中国式权威政治开放经济的道路。这条道路走一二十年后,朝鲜经济会大有起色,他会成为朝鲜的邓小平,那时他将拥有足够的权威开始第二步即政治改革而避免动乱,然后在政治改革成功之后功成身退,成为朝鲜的华盛顿。这是他最好的归宿,现实利益和历史名望兼得,超过他的祖辈父辈,也让先一步改革的中共汗颜。但是我怀疑这小年青得江山太容易,学识经历又贫乏,是否有胆识跨出第二步。最大的可能,是他走上以中为师的不归路,最后也陷入中国今天内外夹攻四面楚歌的困境。
小金哪有小蒋的阅历?
再说了,台湾一向亲美,老百姓有钱了就想搞美式民主,小蒋不过是顺应了民意而已。朝鲜手机网络都没有,恨得美国不行,哪有这民意基础?
北韩局势不稳,恰可为共党政府争取来它希望得到的西方同行的瞩目.所以共党未必不乐见二胖死掉.其次,二胖强硬,三胖则需求助于共党,以巩固其权位.第三,美国尚未对北韩动手,此时换班,可以在美国人动手之前做点准备.第四,二胖死掉之前,共党已预先知道,也做了准备.总之,共党是得分了,虽然这种分是不义之分.
看看三胖肥硕的大脸与普通朝鲜民众的苦难生活,就知道朝鲜是没有希望的,改革也是不可能的.将来只有靠美韩联军再次联手,压过三八线,解决朝鲜半岛问题.
首脑脸对比民众脸,有趣,好像总是相反的。从老毛脸到小胡脸的退化恰是中国人民智商提高思想成熟过程的对照。
三胖能否成事,其实要看摄政王有没有私心,毕竟他现在还嫩,虽说官方公开的他的年龄因为配合造神运动而作了改动,但30左右是一定的,世界上有30岁左右就掌握一个国家的人吗(封建王朝时代不算),现在国际环境那么复杂,三胖少时留学西方,多少会受一些影响,搞封建专制的欲望可能不如金大、金二那么强烈,很可能因为立场中立而显得软弱,这些如果被摄政王姑父当成弱点拿住,他就会以“不成熟”之理由被架空。摄政王当然会继承金二的衣钵,不过到那时可能就是张家王朝的开端了
呵呵,纯属臆测,留帖为证,拭目以待
北韩不会有变化,三胖的权力来自他爹,张成泽的权利也来自金家王朝,所以不会背板自己的家族,只能过一日算一日,还是先军政治,只是可能程度上略有改变罢了。
何老师好,我是广东惠州的一名19岁的小伙,11年来一直有看你的博文,最近也在看你的著作《现代化陷阱》和《雾锁中国》。我眼睛近视,不大好使,感觉博文的字符有点小,能不能稍微把字符调大一点?谢谢。
朝鲜不可能按照你们良好的愿望改变,不变才是他们最大的利益。也是中美俄的利益所在。指望内部发生变化是不现实的,只要王朝的军队还能吃饱饭,就不可能有变化。我们能有今天还得感谢金日成,要不是他发动韩战,我们伟大领袖的接班人咋会死,今天还能看到何老师的文字吗!所以别操心那个王朝那点事。