中国到底有没有拯救欧洲的能力？

近半年多以来，中国将投资拯救欧盟的预期，成为支撑欧元市场的重要信心支柱。10月28日，经过欧盟方多方游说之后，中国外交部副部长傅莹正式宣布，“不存在中国救欧盟”的问题，这个热议了几个月的话题终于尘埃落定。既然北京已打定主意不当拯救欧洲的“白衣骑士”，萨科齐等欧洲国家领导人必须放弃幻想，依靠自己渡过难关了。

中国这次不出手“拯救欧洲”，我认为对双方都有益处，理由有二，一，于欧盟来说，内部问题冰冻三尺，非一日之寒。欧盟诸国那令国民不工作也能舒适生活的高福利制度，既使本国人民丧失了工作动力，也使企业及工作者税负非常沉重，早就成了一个必须动手术的脓疮。只是欧洲政坛大多是善于分钱的左翼当道，更兼无论哪个政党当选，都出于选票考虑，无法痛下决心挤破这个迟早会成为大患的疮疽。其二，中国在欧债已经投入了逾 5000亿的巨额资金，一直在亏损。据说今年以来的投资就亏损近半。从本国利益考虑，确实不应该再继续往里砸钱了。

接下来先讨论的中国那外汇储备到底是谁的财产。

中国那3.2万亿外汇储备，几乎成了国际国内都高度关注的一个藏金窟。盯着这笔财富的当然不只有与这笔巨额财富不相干的欧盟，还有比欧盟更具有资格的本国人民。自从有人提出政府应该将外汇储备分给全国人民以来，有关这个话题的讨论时时出现。鉴于这个话题隐藏着一些不便于让百姓们知道的内情，比如政府买外汇时需要使用大量人民币，这些人民币从印钞机里滚出来必然造成通胀；比如中国巨额外汇储备到底投向哪里，赢亏状态如何；…… 所有这些，除了政府愿意透露的1万多亿美元国债之外，其余的资金投向，都被当作国家机密，基本不向国内人民做任何说明。

但分外汇储备之论日益高涨之后，中国银行界的政府智囊们也先后出来说话，声明外汇储备是央行的负债，每一分都对应着负债，最后必须应该由央行出面偿还。我当然知道这一说法确实没错，因为中国实行外汇管制制度，只要银行的柜台前出现外币，银行就得拿出相应的人民币购买，比如一美元得花6.5元人民币购买。只是智囊们没说两点：一是这钱是依靠政府印钞印出来的，3.2万亿美元得印上20多万亿人民币才“买”得下来，这样巨量的新增货币投放下去，必然造成通胀，最后的买单者还是百姓；二是这些钱用于投资，其增值部分的受益者应该是为通胀买单的中国老百姓。即使不分给国民，也应该将投资收益投放在一些与民生相关的公共事业上，比如医疗保险、失业保险、人人需要使用的水电煤气的补贴等等。

再讨论中国现在究竟有无拯救欧盟的能力。

欧盟翘首盼望中国投入一万亿到欧盟金融稳定基金上来时，似乎设想那外汇储备全都堆在中国央行的金库里，正愁着没地方投放。但事实不是这样，为了减轻通胀压力，中国早就想方设法通过各种渠道减轻外储备压力，如购买外国债券、投资、鼓励国民个人用汇等等。

北京早就不是那种只会将金子埋在地下的土老财，一直在考虑如何盘活盘好这笔外汇资产。自2003年左右就开始实行外汇储备多元化，即“一篮子货币”政策；从2008年开始，北京购买的欧债增多，日元也是购买对象，美元资产现只占其外汇资产的70%左右。尽管中国从来不愿意公布外储资产的篮子，诸如欧元、美元、日元的具体占比，但据大致估算，目前中国持有的美国国债数额约为1.15万亿美元，欧元债券约为5000多亿，还有不知具体数额的日元债券。此外，中国还签订了一些货币互换协议，如俄罗斯石油的200多亿美元，以及对东盟国家的一些协议。目前可动用的外汇储备大约只有5000亿美元，这是为了支付三个月的进口并支付所有的短期外债所需要的最低安全额度。

可以说，3万多亿外汇资产大概各有定向，欧盟狮子大开口要一万亿，完全只是一厢情愿的设想。

欧盟诸国倒真是应该趁这次危机，让国民明白“免费午餐”总有吃到尽头的一天，趁机削减那非常沉重并将自己拖垮的福利包袱。瑞典也曾因高福利、高税收导致国民工作积极性降低，企业外移，积弊日久，导致经济发展滞缓。但2006年瑞典发生政治地震，执政长达65年的左翼政党在大选中失败，强调市场经济的保守派上台并于2010年连任。从此瑞典开始全面变革：税率降低，社会福利得到控制，对企业的各种限制被取消，遗产税、赠与税被废除。在各种改革激励之下，瑞典已逐渐恢复活力，这个样板值得欧盟各国效法。

中国自身的经济困难还刚开始，无论从能力还是从投资策略考量，中国不再向欧元这只盘子里砸钱，都算是明智的自保之举。

Has China the Capacity to Save Europe?
Has China the Capacity to Save Europe?
Written by He Qinglian on November 3, 2011
(translated by krizcpec)
[Words in brackets are added by translator] http://hqlenglish.blogspot.com/2011/11/can-china-save-europe.html

In this half a year or so, the expectation that China would invest and rescue the EU became the pillar of faith that hold up the Euro market. On October 28, after being lobbied by various EU members, China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Fu Ying, officially announced that “the proposition of China rescuing Europe does not exist”. The topic that was being heatedly discussed for months has finally settled. Now that Beijing is determined not to assume the role of “White Knight” to save Europe, European leaders like Nicholas Sarkozy will have to discard their illusion and rely on themselves to weather this crisis.

I think that China refrained from “saving Europe” this time is good for both sides for two reasons.

First: for the EU, the problems in the region are deep rooted and have been around for long. The high welfare benefits the EU member countries adopt that enable the people there to live comfortably without having to work have resulted in both the people’s lacking motivation to work and the heavy tax burden weighing on businesses and those who are employed. It has become an abscess that demanded surgical removal a long time ago. The problem is, however, the Leftists who are good at giving out money dominate most of European politics arena; and no matter which party win an election, with election votes in mind, they couldn’t make up their mind to remove this ulcer of high welfare benefit that will cause serious problems sooner or later. [Now they might have to take the difficult decision to cut back excessive welfare benefits as Beijing refused to help financially.]

Second, China has already purchased €500 billion worth of European bonds, and is suffering losses all along. It is said that almost half of the investment made in Eurozone this year was lost. In view of China’s own interests, no more money should be placed in Europe indeed.

What I will discuss next is whose assets the foreign exchange reserves of China really are.

The 3.2 trillion foreign exchange reserves of China has become the gold chest that attract high attention from both inside the country and elsewhere. It’s not just the EU which has nothing to do with these assets that has an eye on them; the Chinese people, who are more eligible than the EU [to ask for a share], too are fixing their eyes on those assets.

Even since someone proposed that the foreign exchange reserves should be distributed among the whole country, discussions on this topic appear from time to time. As beneath this topic there are insider details that are best kept from the public: for instance, when the government acquires foreign exchanges, huge amount of RMB is needed, these RMB coming out of money printer would definitely bring inflation; and where the massive amount of China’s foreign exchange reserves is placed as well as the gains and losses are, except the over one trillion worth of U.S. dollar bonds, state secrets to the Chinese government and it basically wouldn’t explain the details to the public.

But as the call for distributing the foreign exchanges reserves grew, people from government think-tank in the banking sector came out to say that the foreign exchange reserves are actually the debts of the central bank: each dime of the reserves is matched with debts; and in the end the central bank shall have to repay them.

While I do know that this saying is indeed true: as China implements a foreign exchange control system stipulating that whenever foreign currencies turn up in front of bank counters, the banks must buy in those using corresponding amount of RMB, like every greenback has to be purchased with 6.5 RMB; they did not mention two things.

First, this money is printed by the government. To purchase 3.2 trillion worth of greenbacks over 20 trillion worth of RMB will be needed, this massive amount of new money would definitely cause inflation when it enters the market, in the end it is the public who pays the bill.

The other thing they didn’t mention was that this money is used in investment, and the beneficiaries of any surplus resulted from the investment should be the populace of China who foots the bill of inflation. Even if the gains are not given out to the people, they should be committed to public causes which are related to the people’s livelihood, namely medical insurance, unemployment benefits and subsidies to water, electricity, and gas that everyone need to use, and so on.

Now let’s look at whether or not China has the capacity to save the EU.

When the EU was hoping that China would inject one trillion to European Financial Stability Fund, they seemed to imagine that all those reserves are sitting idly inside the gold chest of China’s central bank and needs to go somewhere. That’s not true. To alleviate the pressure of inflation, China has long resorted to all channels to relieve the pressure of its foreign exchange reserves: they bought bonds from other countries, invested and encouraged individual use of foreign exchanges among its people, so on and so forth.

Beijing had ceased to be the country pumpkin miser that knew nothing but to bury its gold underground long ago. It has been contemplating ways to make good use of this foreign exchange asset. Since 2003 or so it implemented the policy of “a basket of currencies” to diversify its foreign exchange reserves; and from 2008 on, Beijing increased its purchase in EU bonds, Japanese yen has also become its target. Now the greenback makes up only about 70% of China’s foreign exchange assets.

Although China has been reluctant to disclose information of its baskets of foreign exchange reserves, such as the specific ratios of euro, the greenback and the Japanese Yen, based on rough calculation we could still get an idea, albeit inaccurate, of the respective amounts of foreign currencies in China’s reserves: $1.15 trillion in US bonds; €500 billion in euro bonds; as for the Japanese bonds, the specific figure could not be worked out.

Apart from these, China signed currency swap agreements [with other countries.] To cite an example, it struck a deal with Russia [in exchange] for over twenty billion US dollars worth of petroleum. It also reached agreements with ASEAN countries. Currently, China has only about 500 billion in foreign exchange reserves that is available, the minimum amount needed for paying three months of imports and clearing all short-term foreign debts.

We can say that the over three trillion worth of foreign exchange assets are by-and-large committed here and there. The EU’s request that China inject one trillion in the Eurozone is nothing but sheer wishful thinking.

[Instead of looking for outside help,] the EU countries should make their peoples understand that there will come a day when “free lunch” is no longer served and take the opportunity to cut the exceedingly heavy burden of welfare benefits that is driving these countries broke. Sweden at one point had a stagnant economy because of high welfare benefits and staggering taxes that made its people less motivated to work, causing businesses to move out of that country and various problems for a long time.

But in 2006, there was a political earthquake in the country: the left-wing political party that had been governing the Sweden for sixty-five years consecutively lost in the general election, the conservative that stressed market economy came to power and was reelected in 2010. It was then that Sweden started a comprehensive reform package: lowering the tax rates; scaling back social welfare; lifting the various restrictions imposed upon corporations; and abolishing the inheritance, and gift taxes. As a result of these measures, Swedish economy is slowly gaining back its vitality. This country serves as an example for the EU countries to learn from.

China’s own economic problems have only just begun. Judging both from the country’s capability and its investment strategy, China’s decision not to inject more money into the Eurozone should be seen as a wise move of self-protection.